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Climate Change & Global Justice: 10 Perplexing Issues
Climate change poses not only one of the most complex technological and public policy challenges humanity has ever faced; it presents one of the most complex moral questions thus far imagined. There are many reasons for complexity. Here is a list of ten topics for which there are brief summaries below and more extended discussions found by clicking the tabs on the top left hand side of this page.
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Issue # 1: An Inherently International and Intergenerational Issue of Fair Allocation of a Global Commons
Source: gci.org/uk
A crucial feature of climate justice is that it must accommodate the fact that the adverse effects of climate change are a function of the total stock of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas (GHG) accumulations in the atmosphere. What we all do today, what we all do tomorrow, as well as what everyone has done especially since the dawn of the industrial revolution, affects the prospects for health, well-being, and indeed the very possibility of a life-sustaining human habitat for future generations.
The problem, in a nutshell, is that GHG emissions remain in the atmosphere for hundreds and even thousands of years. Even if all GHG emissions were halted now, the stocks remain at dangerously high levels and the effects on climate will continue to unfold. The graph on the right is an optimistic projection - optimistic in terms of how soon emissions might stabilize and then start to decline. Projections vary widely, but it is uncontroversial that if the world proceeds along the path of "business as usual" much of the new additions of GHG will come from places other than the historical large emitters.
We might, then, think of the climate change problem as an issue of how to allocate a global commons. Instead of allocating some increasingly scarce common good (such as fish in the oceans) we are forced to consider the possibility that we have to allocate "common bads" or the right to emit GHGs.
Given the fact that the Earth's atmosphere has reached perhaps half of what many scientists think is the sum total of GHGs (1Trillion metric tons) that would result in a 2 degree Centigrade warming, GHG concentrations and their associated temperature changes will continue to rise (because emissions will not stop overnight). Even if and even if the rate of emissions decline radically, allowing the stocks stabilize at some future date (2050, as has been proposed), and then decline thereafter, it means that for all foreseeable time the planet as a whole will have to operate under a cap or ceiling of permitted emissions.
Who gets to emit under this ceiling? Think of the problem initially as a question of the fair division of a birthday cake. Suppose your older siblings eat half the cake and then proposes to share the remainder of the cake in equal pro rata shares among the entire birthday party. Many will not think it fair to begin rationing of what's left by division into equal shares, since some of the guests already consumed so much more than everyone else.
To make matters worse, suppose that the birthday party never ends. Guests continue to arrive and want a share of the cake. There will not be, in John Locke's famous phrase, "as much and as good" left over for later arrivals. This raises questions of course well beyond the significance of a birthday cake. Given our dependence on fossil fuels for the current standard of living enjoyed by some and desired by many more, we have to think of rationing the very basis of what now makes possible what most consider a minimally decent human life. Mitigating the risk of global warming and its adverse effects can thus be thought of in terms of a need to impose a cap or ceiling on all the future emissions that will be added to and remain for long periods of time in the atmosphere. The significance of such a cap for developing nations becomes clear when we consider the fact that by some estimates, within a few years one or more developing nations may well account for more than half of the carbon stocks that eventually will raise the global temperatures to levels in which environmental and health damages occur.
Climate change is thus a moral problem that is both intergenerational and international. And it is a problem that no nation can solve for itself, on its own. Nor is it even likely that radical reduction of emissions by one, or even a group of heavy emitters, could solve for everyone else, for example, by eliminating entirely their own emissions.
Here is the heart of the first, overarching question of climate justice: What is a fair allocation going forward, given that emissions will not cease anytime soon, and in light of the fact that some nations became rich in substantial part by technologies that produced already half of what many take to be "tolerable" cumulative stocks of GHGs?
The problem, in a nutshell, is that GHG emissions remain in the atmosphere for hundreds and even thousands of years. Even if all GHG emissions were halted now, the stocks remain at dangerously high levels and the effects on climate will continue to unfold. The graph on the right is an optimistic projection - optimistic in terms of how soon emissions might stabilize and then start to decline. Projections vary widely, but it is uncontroversial that if the world proceeds along the path of "business as usual" much of the new additions of GHG will come from places other than the historical large emitters.
We might, then, think of the climate change problem as an issue of how to allocate a global commons. Instead of allocating some increasingly scarce common good (such as fish in the oceans) we are forced to consider the possibility that we have to allocate "common bads" or the right to emit GHGs.
Given the fact that the Earth's atmosphere has reached perhaps half of what many scientists think is the sum total of GHGs (1Trillion metric tons) that would result in a 2 degree Centigrade warming, GHG concentrations and their associated temperature changes will continue to rise (because emissions will not stop overnight). Even if and even if the rate of emissions decline radically, allowing the stocks stabilize at some future date (2050, as has been proposed), and then decline thereafter, it means that for all foreseeable time the planet as a whole will have to operate under a cap or ceiling of permitted emissions.
Who gets to emit under this ceiling? Think of the problem initially as a question of the fair division of a birthday cake. Suppose your older siblings eat half the cake and then proposes to share the remainder of the cake in equal pro rata shares among the entire birthday party. Many will not think it fair to begin rationing of what's left by division into equal shares, since some of the guests already consumed so much more than everyone else.
To make matters worse, suppose that the birthday party never ends. Guests continue to arrive and want a share of the cake. There will not be, in John Locke's famous phrase, "as much and as good" left over for later arrivals. This raises questions of course well beyond the significance of a birthday cake. Given our dependence on fossil fuels for the current standard of living enjoyed by some and desired by many more, we have to think of rationing the very basis of what now makes possible what most consider a minimally decent human life. Mitigating the risk of global warming and its adverse effects can thus be thought of in terms of a need to impose a cap or ceiling on all the future emissions that will be added to and remain for long periods of time in the atmosphere. The significance of such a cap for developing nations becomes clear when we consider the fact that by some estimates, within a few years one or more developing nations may well account for more than half of the carbon stocks that eventually will raise the global temperatures to levels in which environmental and health damages occur.
Climate change is thus a moral problem that is both intergenerational and international. And it is a problem that no nation can solve for itself, on its own. Nor is it even likely that radical reduction of emissions by one, or even a group of heavy emitters, could solve for everyone else, for example, by eliminating entirely their own emissions.
Here is the heart of the first, overarching question of climate justice: What is a fair allocation going forward, given that emissions will not cease anytime soon, and in light of the fact that some nations became rich in substantial part by technologies that produced already half of what many take to be "tolerable" cumulative stocks of GHGs?
Issue # 2: Responsibility for Global Warming Mitigation in the Context of Energy Poverty
Source: Energyfordevelopment.com
Matters of allocating a global cap on emissions are complicated further by the fact that millions of people around the world suffer enormous deprivation due to the lack of energy that, given current technology, tends to be large GHG producers. An estimated 1.5 billion people live without electricity, a situation known as energy poverty. They lack energy to meet everyday household needs such as adequate warmth in winter or alleviating crushing heat in tropical countries. They lack the energy production capacity to purify and deliver water and sanitation services, medical care, or public transport. In these and many other ways they lack the energy production capacity necessary for economic and human development. As might be expected, many of the lesser developed nations have argued for a human right to development, which as a practical matter, has been cast in terms of developmental emissions rights. The language of the UNFCCC reflects a commitment to a priority for development, and philosophers as well as climate treaty negotiators from lesser developed nations have taken up views of this sort. Henry Shue, for example, has argued that we should prioritize the allowance of subsistence emissions over luxury emissions.
Moreover, the world is marked by a variety of differential paths to development, both within and across nations. Some rich nations have achieved their high standard of living in less environmentally destructive ways than others, for example, due to temperate climate that makes fewer energy demands. And even developmental needs, when described at the aggregate country-level mask some morally relevant concerns regarding the claims of fairness by lesser developed nations. Some of the most affluent citizens of poor nations engage in many of the life-style activities that contribute more heavily to the stock of greenhouse gases than their much poorer co-nationals. Some poor persons in less developed nations contribute more heavily to GHG than might be assumed. They often have few choices for meeting their basic needs other than the continued reliance on cooking and heating methods that contribute disproportionately to green house gas accumulation. Better-off persons often can afford more energy-efficient automobiles and homes, for example.
In short, while not all of the major contributions to the problems of GHG concentration derive from high levels of consumption of luxury goods and their high levels of gross domestic product (GDP), but it is safe to say that not all future emissions should be treated as on a moral par. Some are contingently unavoidable just for the sake of subsistence and some further moral claims on emissions rest on the importance of poverty alleviation and the value of raising people above the standard of bare survival to a standard appropriate to a decent human life. All of this assumes, the absence of near-term energy solutions that would render otiose the notion of a global carbon ceiling.
For more on the concept of energy poverty and the role of energy deprivation in the cause and consequence of poverty, see the website for Energy for Development and Poverty Reduction. For a vivid photographic portrayal of what energy poverty means for everyday life, see "life without lights."
Moreover, the world is marked by a variety of differential paths to development, both within and across nations. Some rich nations have achieved their high standard of living in less environmentally destructive ways than others, for example, due to temperate climate that makes fewer energy demands. And even developmental needs, when described at the aggregate country-level mask some morally relevant concerns regarding the claims of fairness by lesser developed nations. Some of the most affluent citizens of poor nations engage in many of the life-style activities that contribute more heavily to the stock of greenhouse gases than their much poorer co-nationals. Some poor persons in less developed nations contribute more heavily to GHG than might be assumed. They often have few choices for meeting their basic needs other than the continued reliance on cooking and heating methods that contribute disproportionately to green house gas accumulation. Better-off persons often can afford more energy-efficient automobiles and homes, for example.
In short, while not all of the major contributions to the problems of GHG concentration derive from high levels of consumption of luxury goods and their high levels of gross domestic product (GDP), but it is safe to say that not all future emissions should be treated as on a moral par. Some are contingently unavoidable just for the sake of subsistence and some further moral claims on emissions rest on the importance of poverty alleviation and the value of raising people above the standard of bare survival to a standard appropriate to a decent human life. All of this assumes, the absence of near-term energy solutions that would render otiose the notion of a global carbon ceiling.
For more on the concept of energy poverty and the role of energy deprivation in the cause and consequence of poverty, see the website for Energy for Development and Poverty Reduction. For a vivid photographic portrayal of what energy poverty means for everyday life, see "life without lights."
Issue # 3: The Ultimate impact Depends on Altering or Regulating Personal Choices
The ultimate impact of increased concentration of dangerous GHG accumulation in the atmosphere depends on the prospects for altering, whether by state regulation or motivating voluntary behavioral changes, indeed, involving many of the individual choices that many consider among the most personal and most private. For example, two of the main drivers of global climate change are demographic factors - overall population increase and increase in the population of persons enjoying higher levels of economic development and personal consumption.
One option then would seem to be to establish policies for limiting the growth of the human population, and such policies are fraught with easily imaginable worries. One might immediately assume that such policies are likely to be targeted at some of the world's most disadvantaged groups, including the familiar ethnically defined groups historically subject to the brute end of eugenic policies.
However, any population policy likely to be part of an effective climate mitigation strategy would have to target the reproductive choices of the global rich. For it is the offspring of the global rich who can be expected to consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources in general and disproportionately contribute to the increase in the stocks of GHGs. For example, If you live in the United States, each child you have increases your lifetime carbon legacy by 5.7 times.
Another option would be to establish policies that change the behavior of citizens of the developed world who consume a vastly disproportionate share of the Earth's resources and in the process, contribute disproportionately to climate change.
For more on arguments surrounding population policies and sustainable consumption goals as climate change mitigation strategies, see the webpage on Adaptation and Mitigation.
One option then would seem to be to establish policies for limiting the growth of the human population, and such policies are fraught with easily imaginable worries. One might immediately assume that such policies are likely to be targeted at some of the world's most disadvantaged groups, including the familiar ethnically defined groups historically subject to the brute end of eugenic policies.
However, any population policy likely to be part of an effective climate mitigation strategy would have to target the reproductive choices of the global rich. For it is the offspring of the global rich who can be expected to consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources in general and disproportionately contribute to the increase in the stocks of GHGs. For example, If you live in the United States, each child you have increases your lifetime carbon legacy by 5.7 times.
Another option would be to establish policies that change the behavior of citizens of the developed world who consume a vastly disproportionate share of the Earth's resources and in the process, contribute disproportionately to climate change.
For more on arguments surrounding population policies and sustainable consumption goals as climate change mitigation strategies, see the webpage on Adaptation and Mitigation.
Issue # 4: Assignment of Moral Responsibility based on Causal Contribution is Not So Easy
The standard way of thinking about environmentally mediated harms to humans caused by pollution is what is often called the Polluter Pays Principle. Under most systems of tort law, as well as ordinary commonsense morality and principles of international law, the assumption is that those who created a problem should bear the costs of remedy, or in the case where prevention or reduction of harm is not possible, the costs of compensation for the losses experienced by others.
Much of the philosophical discussion of climate justice is developed along similar lines. However, the most common worry expressed is over whether the Polluter Pays Principle even makes sense in the climate justice context. There are a number of overlapping reasons for skepticism about such a principle. One reason is that the harmful causal processes are ongoing and dynamic. Historical contributors jointly produce the expected harms from global warming together with current and future actors.
Moreover, many earlier contributors are long dead and beyond reach. In addition, their actions at the time might seem less culpable inasmuch as they did not and could not have known the harm that they would be creating. Critics of proposals to seek redress from the economic successors of these earlier contributors also object to holding the successors and current beneficiaries of the actions of forbearers to account, in part, on the basis of lack of culpable intent or knowledge.
Critics of the Polluter Pay Principle's extended application to successor generations object as well, in part, on the basis of the difficulty in adjudicating whether on balance the carbon contribution that leads to global warming was not a net benefit to humanity at large, for example, through the medicines, inventions, and technological achievements that have diffused throughout the world and made possible a higher standard of living for everyone.
Other criticisms of the Polluter Pays Principle raise thorny questions about apportionment of liability for carbon contributions. Not only is it difficult to apportion causal responsibility among historical actors, any fair apportionment has to account for the ongoing and future contributions in some plausibly proportionate way. Critics object that in principle any such judgment of "rough justice" - which courts have to dispense all the time when there are multiple tort-feasors - is simply much too rough. In addition, the allied worry is that for more politically pragmatic reasons, rather than philosophically principled grounds, there is simply no way to push forward any system that involves some version of the Polluter Pays Principle or incorporates its underlying rationale in concrete policy and treaty provisions.
Much of the philosophical discussion of climate justice is developed along similar lines. However, the most common worry expressed is over whether the Polluter Pays Principle even makes sense in the climate justice context. There are a number of overlapping reasons for skepticism about such a principle. One reason is that the harmful causal processes are ongoing and dynamic. Historical contributors jointly produce the expected harms from global warming together with current and future actors.
Moreover, many earlier contributors are long dead and beyond reach. In addition, their actions at the time might seem less culpable inasmuch as they did not and could not have known the harm that they would be creating. Critics of proposals to seek redress from the economic successors of these earlier contributors also object to holding the successors and current beneficiaries of the actions of forbearers to account, in part, on the basis of lack of culpable intent or knowledge.
Critics of the Polluter Pay Principle's extended application to successor generations object as well, in part, on the basis of the difficulty in adjudicating whether on balance the carbon contribution that leads to global warming was not a net benefit to humanity at large, for example, through the medicines, inventions, and technological achievements that have diffused throughout the world and made possible a higher standard of living for everyone.
Other criticisms of the Polluter Pays Principle raise thorny questions about apportionment of liability for carbon contributions. Not only is it difficult to apportion causal responsibility among historical actors, any fair apportionment has to account for the ongoing and future contributions in some plausibly proportionate way. Critics object that in principle any such judgment of "rough justice" - which courts have to dispense all the time when there are multiple tort-feasors - is simply much too rough. In addition, the allied worry is that for more politically pragmatic reasons, rather than philosophically principled grounds, there is simply no way to push forward any system that involves some version of the Polluter Pays Principle or incorporates its underlying rationale in concrete policy and treaty provisions.
Issue # 5: Individual Moral Responsibility is Problematic, Given how Little Impact any Individual Can Have
Click image for artist Franke James' Answer
It is often noted that there is a breakdown in the traditional linkage between judgments of individual moral responsibility, or what individuals should do, and what needs to happen at an institutional and indeed global institutional level. The claim is a general one, applicable to a variety of issues involving distant harms created by remote actors, each contributing only incrementally to causal processes with global impact, but undertaken from halfway around the world, and with very little understanding of how their actions figure in the larger causal chain and few options to abstain from participation
Given the fact that the adverse effects of climate change are a function of the cumulative stocks of greenhouse gases, there are many instances in which it is plausible to say that what "I do will make no difference" going forward. My rolling back the thermostat is unlikely to prevent any harm to anyone, and my choice to drive a gas guzzler may not add to the harm produced when the collective actions of many persons has resulted in our reaching some environmental tipping point. My discrete and relatively insignificant action is neither sufficient to cause concrete harm to any identifiable person, and even if our collective contributions are jointly sufficient to cause harm, absent some form of collective coordinating action, any sacrifice I might make is simply irrational.
This is not to say that collective action problems are insoluable, or that our sense of moral responsibility is not open to revision, but the familiar linkage between an individual's action and the geographically and temporally proximate in causing harm is no longer an adequate moral guide for living in a globally interconnected world.
Given the fact that the adverse effects of climate change are a function of the cumulative stocks of greenhouse gases, there are many instances in which it is plausible to say that what "I do will make no difference" going forward. My rolling back the thermostat is unlikely to prevent any harm to anyone, and my choice to drive a gas guzzler may not add to the harm produced when the collective actions of many persons has resulted in our reaching some environmental tipping point. My discrete and relatively insignificant action is neither sufficient to cause concrete harm to any identifiable person, and even if our collective contributions are jointly sufficient to cause harm, absent some form of collective coordinating action, any sacrifice I might make is simply irrational.
This is not to say that collective action problems are insoluable, or that our sense of moral responsibility is not open to revision, but the familiar linkage between an individual's action and the geographically and temporally proximate in causing harm is no longer an adequate moral guide for living in a globally interconnected world.
Issue # 6: Is Climate Change the Moral Responsibility of Nation-States? Which Ones?
The upshot of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 was the development of an agreed upon international normative framework for dealing with the common challenge of global warming, including the costs and behavioral changes necessary for mitigation of its severity and allocation of the costs of adaptation to its harmful effects. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) thus set in place the broad outlines of a framework for pursuing agreement among nation-states to act within their own borders to produce overall agree-upon outcomes in co-ordinated, legally binding fashion.
After nearly three dozen conferences, summits, and accords, the Kyoto process finally unraveled at the Durbin Summit in 2012. But the UNFCC framework remains as a normative template from which most discussions of obligations among nations proceeds. The core requirements are quite abstract, but a few key principles are illuminating.
Article 2 states the overall objective: "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."
There is an important caveat, which might be described as an equity proviso: the goal should be promoted within the limits set by what is required for maintaining other goals such as food production, the need for time for adjustment of national economies, and the needs for sustainable economic development. The proviso, in effect, recognized the existence of special burdens, in particular the challenges of deprivation in general, and energy poverty in particular, in developing nations where vast numbers of citizens whose standard of living remains low, in part, due to too little energy consumption.
The UNFCC also endorsed the notion of "common but differentiated responsibilities" among nations. While the account of moral responsibility is open-ended, the underlying understanding of the oft-cited phrase is that the developed nations (Annex I countries) would take the lead, thereby allowing the lesser developed nations to pursue paths to development.
Underlying the normative framework is a strategic moral assumption: that the problem could only be solved by nation-states, acting in concert, with the large majority of the largest GHG emitters operating under a set of legally binding obligations, backed by penalties.
Although the normative framework is quite abstract, the legacy of interpretations of its core ideas has given rise to controversies. For example, under the leadership of China, initially the suggestion was made that the emissions allowances remaining until the dangerous accumulation level is reached should be allocated on a per capita basis among countries. One obvious disadvantage of such a proposal - for the proponents themselves - is that it means giving everyone an equal right to emit going forward only after roughly half of the maximum greenhouse gas stocks (.5 metric tonne of a total of 1 Trillion metric tonnes) already have been used up by the developed nations for their own advancement.
Other critics raise objections to the underlying idea of a normative framework that assigns primary responsibility to nation-states rather than to individual polluters or individual consumers whose high carbon-intensity lifestyles have been and remain the primary drivers of climate change. In a similar vein, some critics argue that nations-states are not necessarily the best advocates for the interests of their citizens, and that apportioning responsibility - or emission rights - to nations ignores the fact that some poor people reside in rich nations and some rich people reside in poor nations. Responsibility for past and present carbon footprints, as well as rights to emit prospectively, they claim, should somehow be individually tailored to reflect the moral posture of particular individuals rather than the aggregate moral profile of nations.
After nearly three dozen conferences, summits, and accords, the Kyoto process finally unraveled at the Durbin Summit in 2012. But the UNFCC framework remains as a normative template from which most discussions of obligations among nations proceeds. The core requirements are quite abstract, but a few key principles are illuminating.
Article 2 states the overall objective: "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."
There is an important caveat, which might be described as an equity proviso: the goal should be promoted within the limits set by what is required for maintaining other goals such as food production, the need for time for adjustment of national economies, and the needs for sustainable economic development. The proviso, in effect, recognized the existence of special burdens, in particular the challenges of deprivation in general, and energy poverty in particular, in developing nations where vast numbers of citizens whose standard of living remains low, in part, due to too little energy consumption.
The UNFCC also endorsed the notion of "common but differentiated responsibilities" among nations. While the account of moral responsibility is open-ended, the underlying understanding of the oft-cited phrase is that the developed nations (Annex I countries) would take the lead, thereby allowing the lesser developed nations to pursue paths to development.
Underlying the normative framework is a strategic moral assumption: that the problem could only be solved by nation-states, acting in concert, with the large majority of the largest GHG emitters operating under a set of legally binding obligations, backed by penalties.
Although the normative framework is quite abstract, the legacy of interpretations of its core ideas has given rise to controversies. For example, under the leadership of China, initially the suggestion was made that the emissions allowances remaining until the dangerous accumulation level is reached should be allocated on a per capita basis among countries. One obvious disadvantage of such a proposal - for the proponents themselves - is that it means giving everyone an equal right to emit going forward only after roughly half of the maximum greenhouse gas stocks (.5 metric tonne of a total of 1 Trillion metric tonnes) already have been used up by the developed nations for their own advancement.
Other critics raise objections to the underlying idea of a normative framework that assigns primary responsibility to nation-states rather than to individual polluters or individual consumers whose high carbon-intensity lifestyles have been and remain the primary drivers of climate change. In a similar vein, some critics argue that nations-states are not necessarily the best advocates for the interests of their citizens, and that apportioning responsibility - or emission rights - to nations ignores the fact that some poor people reside in rich nations and some rich people reside in poor nations. Responsibility for past and present carbon footprints, as well as rights to emit prospectively, they claim, should somehow be individually tailored to reflect the moral posture of particular individuals rather than the aggregate moral profile of nations.
Issue #7: We're Not "All in This Together": Some Countries Are Being Affected "First and Worst"
click image to enlarge
One important fact of life for global justice is that, contrary to much rhetoric designed to motivate individual behavioral change, is that we are not "all in this together." Indeed, some of the countries most likely to be hardest hit and hit first by the adverse consequences of climate change (what I call the "First, Worst Problem") are among the poorest, least developed, driest, most dependent on subsistance agriculture, and least capable of undertaking strategies for mitigation and adaptation.
While those who have benefited most historically may not ultimately be the most causally responsible for the effects of global warming, projections suggest that those who are already among the planet's least advantaged are poised to suffer the most harm while having derived the least benefits from the very processes of development that caused the harm. While the talk of climate change "winners" may be overstated, there is much more to be explored with respect to what justice demands toward the climate change 'losers." See the journal abstract for the original paper by Samson et al, and a brief discussion of its findings. This recent study furthers the central claims of differential regional impacts from the IPCC's 4th Assessment. Note, however, that the global map showing the vulnerability of human populations looks very different from a NASA map of global warming's likely effects on other species and ecosystems in general.
There is perhaps no more eloquent, richly detailed articulation of the differential climate disruptions across the globe and the vast differences in human vulnerability to climate skocks than the the Report's Summary, available for download (31 pages). For more on these and related issues of differential impact, see Climate Roulette.
While those who have benefited most historically may not ultimately be the most causally responsible for the effects of global warming, projections suggest that those who are already among the planet's least advantaged are poised to suffer the most harm while having derived the least benefits from the very processes of development that caused the harm. While the talk of climate change "winners" may be overstated, there is much more to be explored with respect to what justice demands toward the climate change 'losers." See the journal abstract for the original paper by Samson et al, and a brief discussion of its findings. This recent study furthers the central claims of differential regional impacts from the IPCC's 4th Assessment. Note, however, that the global map showing the vulnerability of human populations looks very different from a NASA map of global warming's likely effects on other species and ecosystems in general.
There is perhaps no more eloquent, richly detailed articulation of the differential climate disruptions across the globe and the vast differences in human vulnerability to climate skocks than the the Report's Summary, available for download (31 pages). For more on these and related issues of differential impact, see Climate Roulette.
Issue # 8: Should Our Precautionary Steps be Driven by Worst-Case Scenarios?
The classic statement of the precautionary principle is found in the "Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle,” found on the website for the Science and Environmental Health Network. The principle is subject of many variations in its formulation, but at its heart is a somewhat risk-averse presumption against widespread development and dissemination new, but theoretically risky technologies in the absence of evidence of safety.
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union explicitly calls for adopting the precautionary principle in European environmental policy, even as it also urges consideration of the likely costs and benefits of specific measures. Article 130R(2) of the treaty provides advice as follows:
"Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies."
The Rio Declaration, adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and incorporated into Article 3.3 of the UNFCC, contains a similar statement: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”This is a somewhat modest statement of the degree of precaution required because, as observers have noted, it does not apply to all innovations or all potential threats, but only those that pose “threats of serious or irreversible damage.”
There are quite a few unsympathetic critics among philosophers, academic lawyers, and policy analysts. Among the more well-known critics is that found in Cass Sunstein's editorial, “Throwing Precaution to the Wind: Why the ‘Safe’ Choice Can Be Dangerous,” Boston Globe, July 13, 2008. For a more extensive critique by Sunstein, see his book, The Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Sunstein has identified several cognitive biases that reinforce the precautionary principle’s appeal. These include loss aversion, the myth of a benevolent nature, the availability heuristic, probability neglect, and system neglect. Sunstein's views, as well as his decisions as a government official, where he was in charge of the review of costs and benefits of proposed federal regulations, has been the subject of controversy within the environmental and public health communities.
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty creating the European Union explicitly calls for adopting the precautionary principle in European environmental policy, even as it also urges consideration of the likely costs and benefits of specific measures. Article 130R(2) of the treaty provides advice as follows:
"Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies."
The Rio Declaration, adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and incorporated into Article 3.3 of the UNFCC, contains a similar statement: “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”This is a somewhat modest statement of the degree of precaution required because, as observers have noted, it does not apply to all innovations or all potential threats, but only those that pose “threats of serious or irreversible damage.”
There are quite a few unsympathetic critics among philosophers, academic lawyers, and policy analysts. Among the more well-known critics is that found in Cass Sunstein's editorial, “Throwing Precaution to the Wind: Why the ‘Safe’ Choice Can Be Dangerous,” Boston Globe, July 13, 2008. For a more extensive critique by Sunstein, see his book, The Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Sunstein has identified several cognitive biases that reinforce the precautionary principle’s appeal. These include loss aversion, the myth of a benevolent nature, the availability heuristic, probability neglect, and system neglect. Sunstein's views, as well as his decisions as a government official, where he was in charge of the review of costs and benefits of proposed federal regulations, has been the subject of controversy within the environmental and public health communities.
Issue # 9: Integrated Assessment Models: Should Cost-Benefit Analysis be Used for Climate Change?
One of the main technical instruments for assessing the impact of climate change and evaluating feasible public policy options for addressing them is known as an Integrated Assessment Model (IAM). IAMs attempt to estimate the likely trajectory of greenhouse has emissions, identify their impact on agriculture, human health, the economy, and social infrastructure, assign economic values to those losses, and arrive at some economic measure of the cost of alternative public policies for their mitigation. So for example, one estimate of the social cost per ton of carbon dioxide (known as SCC, but really, including all the greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide) is $310 per ton, while the estimate used in official US governmental agency calculations is $21-24 per ton. Every step in the IAM process is steeped in controversial empirical and normative assumptions often overlooked in discussions of climate change policy.
Issue # 10: How Should We Prioritize Policies of Mitigation and Adaptation?
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Mitigation strategies are designed to slow, reduce and ultimately reverse the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Adaptation strategies are designed to aid communities in coping with and lessening the overall adverse impact of global warming that is not mitigated by countervailing policies.
Mitigation strategies necessarily help everyone who is adversely affected by climate change. No country can act to mitigate the accumulation of greenhouse gases without thereby benefiting every other country harmed by further accumulations.
But countries need to develop adaptation strategies as well, and these are designed to assist citizens and residents of that particular locale. It might be beneficial for local communities to increase the use of air conditioning so that its citizens can tolerate increases in temperature and thereby avoid heat-induced health problems. But it works against the goal of mitigation insofar as it adds to the stocks of greenhouse gases.
Countries may wish for greater energy independence in the face of increased global demand for fossil fuels in an increasingly energy-scarce global economy. It can the local community to adapt to hotter temperatures if the biofuel comes from converting farmland where traditional crops no longer fare well to to increased heat. It such a case, the biofuel conversion would be both useful for adaptation and mitigation. However, biofuel conversion would serve the aim of mitigation if the biofuel that is selected requires less energy to produce and does not result in a compensating loss of carbon sinks. Not all biofuels do, and many question whether so-called second generation biofuels, especially in particular locales, meet the test of net carbon reduction aims.
Mitigation strategies necessarily help everyone who is adversely affected by climate change. No country can act to mitigate the accumulation of greenhouse gases without thereby benefiting every other country harmed by further accumulations.
But countries need to develop adaptation strategies as well, and these are designed to assist citizens and residents of that particular locale. It might be beneficial for local communities to increase the use of air conditioning so that its citizens can tolerate increases in temperature and thereby avoid heat-induced health problems. But it works against the goal of mitigation insofar as it adds to the stocks of greenhouse gases.
Countries may wish for greater energy independence in the face of increased global demand for fossil fuels in an increasingly energy-scarce global economy. It can the local community to adapt to hotter temperatures if the biofuel comes from converting farmland where traditional crops no longer fare well to to increased heat. It such a case, the biofuel conversion would be both useful for adaptation and mitigation. However, biofuel conversion would serve the aim of mitigation if the biofuel that is selected requires less energy to produce and does not result in a compensating loss of carbon sinks. Not all biofuels do, and many question whether so-called second generation biofuels, especially in particular locales, meet the test of net carbon reduction aims.